CHAPTER IV

SYRIA AND THE WEST

The object of the campaign of 743 did not contemplate direct conflict with Urartu itself. The day for such a vital move was not yet at hand. The triumph over Median foes, although decisive, was in no way to be compared with the struggle which Sardurri III of Urartu was prepared to wage for supremacy in Asia. He was a foe worthy of the utmost consideration; nor would he and his people fight the less furiously and bitterly against Assyria, because the gage of the coming battle was not some petty principality, but overlordship of the whole of the northern half of the continent or perhaps independence itself. There was no room for two great powers of equal strength and resources in Asia. Great nations had not yet learned how to live amicably side by side. Between them there was sure to be constant conflict until one or the other was either thoroughly subjugated and rendered dependent upon its conqueror or was altogether annihilated. To be less powerful than a neighboring people was in itself a prophecy that independence would be short-lived.

As the situation now stood in Asia, either Assyria or Urartu must expect to bow to the superior prowess of the other, and the issue might hinge upon the result of a single engagement. Nor was that issue at all a foregone conclusion. Assyria's glorious tradition was a valuable asset in the struggle to come, but this great tradition was not by any means her only weapon. As has been seen, when Tiglath Pileser III came to the throne, Assyria was in a state of lethargy, but her fundamental vitality and vigor were not impaired. It only needed a vigorous, able ruler, with whom the majority of the nation should be in full accord, to arouse her to great endeavor. That Tiglath Pileser was such a man his two previous campaigns clearly indicated; but the Urartian, too, had become accustomed to victory, and not only over petty nations, but over Assyria itself. As we saw in Chapter II, from the time of Ramman-Nirari III, up to the very date of Tiglath Pileser's coronation, Urartian power had been steadily increasing. Menuas had measured strength with Assyria, and both he and his son Argistis had proved themselves the most aggressive and successful monarchs of their dynasty. Tiele has made a list of the most important of the possessions of Menuas, and it includes the land of the Hittites, Melitene, Man, and Urmedi. He in his turn bequeathed to his successor, Sardurri III, an empire the largest part of which had been wrested from Assyria, and had been among her most valuable possessions. When Tiglath Pileser came into contact with Sardurri, Urartian territory had attained its widest extent. Its northern and northeastern boundary line ran through the Plains of Alexandrapal and Gokcha Lake (Transcaucasia) and stretched on the northwest to Hassankala near Erzerum, Aschgerd, and Delibaba. On the west was the Murad Tschai, with the furthest outposts at Masgerd north of Kharput, and at Isoli. On the south its line ran along the mountain range between Armenia and Mesopotamia, and on the extreme east, from Gokcha Lake to Ordaklu. Nor does this large empire seem to have hung together loosely. The manner in which many of the independent states resisted Tiglath Pileser proves that the Urartian kings had succeeded to a surprising degree in rendering vassals and tributaries firm in their fidelity. The determined and bitter opposition which the Syrian princes offered to the arms of Tiglath Pileser, compelling him to spend three years in the West before they could be forced to forswear their adherence to Sardurri, indicates the large measure of Urartian mastery over very wide territorial possessions.

Sardurri had also shown his capacity for military accomplishments. By the year 755 he had conquered Melitene, and by 744 the countries of Taurus and Amanus were also his. Upon these and the support of Arpad he could depend in the contest now before him. It is indeed a matter of wonder that he did not press on to the further West and conquer both Damascus and Israel. The first was at this time very weak, and Israel, though apparently prosperous during the reign of Jeroboam II, was, as Amos testifies, not inherently strong. The weakness of neighboring kingdoms fully accounts for the outward glory of Jeroboam's reign; and even this was beginning to fade during the last years of his life. Perhaps Sardurri realized that it was impolitic to attempt further extension of territory at this time, because Tiglath Pileser had shown that he was no weakling. It would suffice the Urartian king for the time being, if he could only hold his own against Assyria. Nor was it any part of his plan to push further west away from his home provinces, and leave a strong enemy in his rear. He could afford to let the Assyrian make the first move. This, Tiglath Pileser was compelled to do. Perhaps one of the secret wishes he entertained in making his campaign of the previous year in Armenia and the East was that Sardurri would leave Van and come south to meet him on neutral ground. But Sardurri did not stir. To have attempted to march against Sardurri's capital and strike at the very centre of things would have meant a long trying journey through snow-bound mountain passes, easy for the Armenian to defend. For a hazardous attempt of that kind Tiglath Pileser was not prepared in 744. He dared not risk the chance of a reverse. In that case the Urartian allies would have clung all the closer to their allegiance, and it was with these allies, particularly with the Hittites and Syrians, that much of Sardurri's power lay.

The most promising plan, therefore, was to strike somewhere in Northern Syria. The tribute and taxes from this rich part of Asia were essential to Sardurri, and their threatened loss would not fail to bring him from his mountain-guarded capital into the plains. Here without incurring the danger, fatigue, and delay of a long march around Lake Van, the advantage was with Tiglath Pileser. Should Sardurri stay at home, he would be the loser, since that must have amounted to a confession of fear, and as such have been a moral blow at the influence of Urartu.

The sources mention Agusi, Qummuh, Melid, Samal and Gargum, as the active allies with whom Tiglath Pileser had to deal. Early in 743 he marched west, and the Canon entry for that year reads, 'ina Arpadda', in the city of Arpad. Nowhere in his inscriptions does Tiglath Pileser hint of a battle or a siege which secured to him the possession of the city in this year. There is no justification, with Rost, to change the preposition from, ina, to ana, and on that basis postulate a situation wherein Tiglath Pileser besieges that city and was forced to raise the siege when he heard that Sardurri was coming to the relief of his ally. The Canon distinctly reads, Ina Arpadda. But we do not know how he entered and took possession of it. Tiele thinks that in 744 Arpad was in possession of Assyria, and that Tiglath Pileser meant to use it in this campaign as a base of operations. At any rate, although we do not know how Tiglath Pileser entered the city, for it was the capital of Mati'ilu, the strongest ally of Sardurri, we are forced to admit the fact. While there preparing for operations against the surrounding small states, the news of Sardurri's approach was announced. From the northeast the Armenian came through Kilhi and Ulluba, across the Tigris, and then east of the Euphrates into Qummuh. He had reached a point between Kistan and Halpi when Tiglath Pileser appeared, and the rivals joined battle between the two cities. Sardurri sustained a bad defeat. He fled the field on the back of a mare. His loss was 72,900 men (Annals 66). His baggage-train, horses, mules, chariots, even his personal ornaments, became the spoil of the victor; and the servants and skilled workmen who had followed the army were made captives. Yet despite all this the battle was not decisive. A single victory had not decided the fate of the West, nor was Sardurri entirely helpless. The picture of a complete triumph with which the Annals would impress us is not the full story. The victory must have cost Tiglath Pileser much of his strength. He was compelled to return to Nineveh and prepare his forces for another campaign in Syria. The allies were not intimidated because of Tiglath Pileser's victory. He found them even more difficult to overcome than Sardurri himself; and this is especially true of Mati'ilu of Agusi. It was he who made Tiglath Pileser spend three years in Northern Syria, prosecuting secondary campaigns, but principally endeavoring to reduce the city of Arpad. We have seen that the Canon for 743 records the entrance of Tiglath Pileser into Arpad. The year 742 tells of another expedition against the same city; likewise the entry for 741, adding that it took three years to capture Arpad. As has been said, in 743 Tiglath Pileser left Arpad to meet Sardurri in Qummuh. Thus, if that city only surrendered to the Assyrian king in 741, it appears that while Tiglath Pileser was engaged in Kistan, the allies in Syria took Arpad during his absence. And the great king, exhausted by the all-day battle in Qummuh, could do nothing more in 743 than capture a few cities in that land. Ezzida, Harbisina, and Ququsansu, he sacked after crossing the Euphrates.

While Tiglath Pileser was wintering in Nineveh preparing for a resumption of operations in Syria in the following year, Mati'ilu made ready for the inevitable siege of Arpad. He would have made his peace with Tiglath Pileser, and had he done so, it is probable that he would have received reasonable terms. But Sardurri had escaped into his own land, and his ally expected him to gather a new force with which to come to the help of the beleaguered confederates in Syria. When therefore the Assyrian again appeared before Arpad he faced a very sturdy opposition. How well Arpad must have prepared for this siege is evident from the time it required to take the city. Certainly Tiglath Pileser did not sit down idly before the walls and quietly await the starvation of the city. Expeditions from his armed camp were sent out in all directions and the allies were carefully watched, in order to prevent concerted action. When in 740 the city at last capitulated, all the members of the league save one were anxious to compound with the victor. The fate of Mati'ilu was sealed. He lost his throne, and were the records complete, we should undoubtedly hear of his execution. Uriarik of Que, Pisiris of Karkamis, Kustaspi of Qummuh, and Tarhulara of Gargum hurried to Arpad in person to make peace with Tiglath Pileser and acknowledge his overlordship. The terms he exacted were heavy. The Annals, wherein the amount of tribute was stated, are broken (Annals 89-90); all that remains is the mention of ivory, elephant skin, purple cloth, lead, silver, and gold. But the measure of their humiliation was complete, and they had no desire to prolong resistance. Had they seen fit to do so, a new leader would have proclaimed himself in the person of Tutamu of Unqi. Unqi, originally only the western edge of Patin, had at this time gained control of the whole country. It lay between the Euphrates and the Orontes rivers, and stretched north beyond the Afrin. The capital city was Kinalia, and against it Tiglath Pileser proceeded without delay. From a passage in Asurb. III. 70-92, we may determine the route which the army followed. They started from a point between Karkemis and Til-Barsip and had to cross the Afrin before reaching Kinalia. But they first reach Hazzaz (Azaz). This being an important city, there was probably a military road from Karkemis and Hazzaz, which led to the Afrin River. In later (pre-Grecian) times, such a road went from Birejik (Zeugma), a little south of the site of Karhemis to Aintab. After capturing Hazzaz, Tiglath Pileser dealt similarly with Aribua, and continuing south struck the road which comes up from Aleppo, runs a little south of Hazzaz, and thence through the Syrian Gates to Beilan and the coast. He came to Kinalia after following this road across the Afrin, and took it without much difficulty. In the course of the attack it was destroyed. This we must infer because in Annals 97 we are told that it was rebuilt. Unqi was placed under a provincial governor, and much booty compensated for the expense and trouble of the campaign. Tutamu forfeited his life. His fate was a dire warning to all neighboring princes, and it was lucky for Hiram of Tyre and Rezin of Damascus that their emissaries had been hastened to Tiglath Pileser with tokens of submission shortly after he had reduced Arpad.

Tiglath Pileser was not yet finished in the far West, but it will perhaps be better for us, for the time being, to disregard the chronological order of his campaigns, and leave his activities in Ulluba (739), and the expeditions against Media (737), and Mt. Nal (73G), and that against Urartu (735), for other chapters, and to continue here the details of his work against Syria, Phoenicia, Philistia, Israel, and Judah, which occupied him in 738, and again from 734 to 732 inclusive.

The principal countries of the West which remained independent of Assyria after Tiglath Pileser's campaign of 740, were Syria, Israel and Judah, Phoenicia and Philistia. With these in his possession the Assyrian king would have been supreme from the Tigris to the Mediterranean Sea. Perhaps he had originally intended to devote the year 739 to the subjugation of these countries and the reduction of the entire West. But during that year trouble broke out among the Nairi peoples and a campaign had to be undertaken against Ulluba. The uprising in that country was probably incited by Sardurri. Seeing that Tiglath Pileser was rapidly becoming master of the West, the king of Urartu fomented trouble in Ulluba, hoping thereby to compel his Assyrian rival to hurry back to the East and thus give the western kings an opportunity to form a league against their conqueror. In this Sardurri was more than successful. Princes and principalities which had been subdued in 740 rebelled against the Assyrian yoke. Thus when the work of 739 in Ulluba was completed Tiglath Pileser naturally prepared for a second western campaign, and accordingly in 738 we find him once again in Syria. Up to this year Sardurri's plan of fomenting rebellions against Tiglath Pileser in one part of Asia while the latter was busy in another, had been successful. While the Assyrian king was engaged in the West, rebellions inspired by the Urartian monarch broke out in the East. And when Tiglath Pileser hurried East to crush them, Sardurri incited revolts in the West. It was because of this fact, as we have seen, that Tiglath Pileser was compelled to operate in Ulluba in 739, instead of devoting that year to a continuation of the Syrian campaigns of 740. But Tiglath Pileser was too great a conqueror to be long diverted from his great purpose by such machinations. With Ulluba conquered he was only one step nearer to his ultimate goal; viz., the conquest of Urartu. Nor did Sardurri gain much by the formation of the new league of western kings with which Tiglath Pileser had to deal in 738. For the latter defeated the western confederacy, and when he was ready to come to a final accounting with Sardurri, it was no longer necessary for him to do preliminary work in Ulluba, since that country was already his.

For the Syrian campaign of 738 the Canon makes the objective point Kullani. Its ruler probably played an important part in the uprising, but the real leader was Azriau of Yaudi. Yaudi had been governed by the house of Panammu of Samal, and undoubtedly under that dynasty had, as a result of the conquest of Arpad, become attached to Assyria. Now that a new coalition, independent of Urartian leadership, proposed to contest supremacy with Tiglath Pileser, the kingship of Azriau, who was not of the house of Panammu, points to the overthrow of the pro-Assyrian party in Yaudi. The confederacy, including the 'XIX districts of Hamath', was made up of cities and states situated between the Mediterranean and the Orontes north of Lebanon. It is not probable that Israel or Damascus was actively involved in this uprising, although it is somewhat surprising that Rezin was not the prime mover. He had begun about this time to make himself felt in Northeastern Syria, and was certainly the most powerful monarch in that part of the country. His resources were ample for a determined conflict, as he proved in 732. Now, he and Menahem of Israel hasten to render tribute as soon as the news of Azriai's defeat reached them, and all the confederated kings swore fidelity to the great conqueror. Qummuh, Tyre, Que, Gebal, Karkemis, Hamath, Samal, Gurgum, Melid, Kask, Tabal, Atun, Tuhan, Istunda, and Husimna, and even the land of an Arabian queen, Zabibi, became vassals of Assyria. The tribute they were obliged to render included money, precious metals, wood, cloth, camels, horses, and herds of cattle. The booty was so large that it seems as though Tiglath Pileser's object was not only to reimburse himself for the cost of the campaign, but also to make Middle and North Syria too poor to dream of the possibility of revolt for years to come. With that end in view he also colonized the territory with settlers from Western Media, where, while he was occupied with the Syrian league, a rebellion had arisen. Sardurri, unable to face the Assyrian king on the open field, sought to hamper him by diplomacy and intrigue; for doubtless the uprising among the Median tribes in this year was due to Urartian influence. But if Sardurri thought that Tiglath Pileser would hurry east and leave the allies in Syria free to throw off the yoke, he miscalculated. Tiglath Pileser did indeed find himself compelled to leave Syria after crushing the rebellion, and to postpone the conquest of South Syria, Israel, and Judah, and the Lebanon region until another time; and he had in 737 to proceed against Media itself. But he was able to deal with Azriau and his allies in 738, and subdue them so thoroughly that, when four years later he traversed their lands, en route to Damascus, they were harmless to harass him. The revolt on the Babylonian border was soon checked by the governors of Nairi and Lullumi, who sent about 25,000 prisoners to Tiglath Pileser. He settled them in the cities of Unqi, and then had thousands of the Hittites scattered throughout the Nairi lands.

For three years there was peace in the West. On the surface of things, all the princes who had sworn allegiance to Tiglath Pileser continued faithful, and he, satisfied that further operations in that direction could wait until Sardurri had been reckoned with, did not return until 734. For that year, according to the Canon, Philistia was the objective point. But it would have been strange if the real trouble had not proceeded from another quarter. In 738 Rezin had hurried to placate Tiglath Pileser with gifts. (The tribute list for 738 includes North and Middle Syrian rulers; viz., Hamath, Samaria, Phoenicia, i.e. Tyre, and Gubal. In that of 734 Damascus is missing, but new names occur; viz., Armad (modern Island of Ruad); , Ammon, Moab, Askalon, Judah, Edom, Gaza).

But, as has been observed, Damascus was a powerful state. Its position among the Middle and South Syrian kingdoms was a leading one, and some of its earlier rulers had proved their power, even in conflict with Assyria itself. Ramman-Nirari, despite his boastful language, had found its king Mari a strong foe; and now in 734 Rezin had again succeeded in making his kingdom of Damascus a state to be reckoned with. No doubt Tiglath Pileser had his eyes fixed on the countries beyond Damascus, including Palestine. It is also almost certain that this great king had planned a future conquest of Egypt. Damascus was the real obstacle in his way. Cappadocia and Que on the north shore of the Gulf of Iskanderun were his; so was Syria south of Damascus, and even that together with Israel was already nominally in his hands, but since Mati'ilu of Arpad had opposed him for three years, Rezin was prepared to do no less. Why the Canon makes the principal goal of this year's expedition Philistia we do not know. The mutilated condition of the Annals for the two succeeding years compel us to go to the Biblical sources for a picture of the operations which follow.

The record of Menahem's tribute is the point of departure. This king came to the throne as a result of anarchy in Israel. His short reign was unsettled; and his successor, Pekahiah, was murdered by Pekah, the captain of the palace guard. Anarchy in the north gave Judah her long-expected opportunity. Alone, in her troubled state, Israel was in no position to cope with her southern opponent. She had to invoke outside help, and the logical ally was Damascus. Pekah called Rezin to his aid, and the two together laid siege to Jerusalem. Ahaz, who had only recently come to the throne of Judah, did not know whither to turn for succor. Isaiah's advice he rejected. The enemies without the gate had to be repulsed. Nor did they seem to Ahaz to be as insignificant as 'two tails of a smoking firebrand'. Of what good was it to him that before many years the riches of Damascus and Israel would 'be carried away before the eyes of the king of Assyria'. And of what use was faith in God while Pekah was hammering away at the gates? 'The waters of Shiloh that go slowly' (Is. VIII. 6) were not quenching the firebrands. It became imperative to enlist help from some quarter, and there were but two possibilities, Egypt or Assyria. Of these two, Assyria was the logical ally, because Israel had traditionally made alliance with Egypt (Hos. VIII. 12). Ahaz appealed to Tiglath Pileser, since from him he could expect more consideration than from Pharaoh. 'I am thy servant and thy son; come up and save me out of the hands of the king of Syria and out of the hands of the king of Israel' (2 K. XVI. 7). No second invitation was needed. Menahem had already paid tribute, but now Tiglath Pileser had an excuse to overrun the country. He came, but had no need to proceed against Samaria or against Damascus as yet. Ahaz had invoked his aid, but the Assyrian had his own plans. En route to Jerusalem there were other lands to conquer. Moreover, Rezin and Pekah went each his own way; the one to Samaria, the other to Damascus.

Probably taking the usual route through the Lebanon depression in the Orontes valley, Tiglath Pileser made several Phoenician cities tributary, and an expedition into Philistia under one of his generals succeeded in subduing that land. Hanno of Gaza, not daring to resist and unwilling to surrender, fled to Egypt. We may see from this circumstance that the eye of Egypt was upon current events. Egypt was never safe without outposts in Syria and never failed, when possible, to secure and hold these. Tiglath Pileser was working his way rapidly into the zone where every advance step must have caused apprehension to the Pharaoh. The latter probably had promised aid to Hanno, as he had often done with Israel and Judah; for it was very necessary for him to keep a buffer between himself and Assyria, but he failed to keep his promise. Gaza's independence was important to Egypt, for it was the nearest city on the trade route between Egypt and Syria, and controlled this route. With Hanno a fugitive, Gaza fell into Tiglath Pileser's hands. He now proceeded to deal with Pekah. On the western borders of Israel (2 K. XV. 29), "The king of Assyria took Ijon, and Abel-beth-maacah, and Janoah and Kedesh and Hazor and Gilead and Galilee and all the land of Naphthali, and he carried them captives into Assyria". Pekah must have resisted valiantly, and the losses of Israel would doubtless have been greater but for the presence of a pro-Assyrian party. Pekah's folly in allying himself with Rezin and thus becoming the indirect cause of Assyrian intervention, probably accounts for his murder (2 K. XV. 30). The new king, Hosea, certainly the leader of the pro-Assyrian party, was allowed by Tiglath Pileser to retain his throne as a tributary. That he swore fidelity to Assyria we see from 2 K. XVII. 3, 4. There we are told that Shalmaneser "found conspiracy" in him, . . . or he had sent messengers to So, king of Egypt.

Tiglath Pileser was now free to deal with Damascus. Assyria and Syria had met on the battlefield in past times, and both had registered victories, but Rezin seems to have lacked both the ability and the prudence of his predecessors. It is not clear why he separated from Pekah instead of remaining with him to face the common foe. Perhaps Rezin feared that should the battle take place in Israel, Tiglath Pileser had a sufficient force to send troops against Damascus while he himself was busy helping to defend Israel. Such an expedition was actually sent against Philistia, while the main army was engaged in Western Israel. Also Rezin had other allies. That he may have considered it better policy to keep Tiglath Pileser busy in Israel, west of Anti-Lebanon, and cause him to weaken his forces in fighting Pekah, so that he himself could gain time to form a new confederacy, is possible. Perhaps in his view that was a wiser course than to trust to the issue of a single battle.

The Syrian proved as difficult to overcome as Sardurri, but the latter at least saved his capital. Rezin after a long siege had to surrender his royal city, but not until his outlying dominion was ravaged from one end to the other, and its cities, towns, and hamlets sacked. Rezin himself suffered death. The inhabitants of Damascus were transplanted to Kir. The districts which were conquered in 732 were placed under a provincial governor with his residence at Damascus.

Metena of Tyre, and Mitinti of Askalon, who had formed the new coalition with Rezin, lost heavily in tribute, and the last, crazed by his misfortunes, was replaced by his son Rukiptu, as an Assyrian vassal. To add to the wide extent of the conquest, an Arabian queen, Samsi, who may have been an active ally of Rezin's, was pursued into her home country, and after the defeat of her troops, and the payment of heavy tribute, was allowed to keep her throne. Many of the Arabian tribes were made tributary, and of these, one, the Idibi'il, were stationed to guard and control the Arabian Mucri.

Now the princes of all the West hastened to do homage to the conqueror. At Damascus he established a temporary court, and from far and near came trembling rulers with promises of loyalty and with presents. The booty which they were compelled to deliver was enormous. Only one prince, Uassurmi of Tabal, dared to absent himself, and for this presumption he had the humiliation of seeing a "nobody" placed on his throne.

Assyria was now mistress of Asia, from the Uknu River to the Philistian coast, in the south, and on the north, from the Mediterranean to Qummuh. The East, to the Caspian, had been conquered in 736. Media had been thoroughly subdued in 737. Urartu had been rendered harmless in 735. Only the work of freeing Babylonia of the Chaldeans remained to be done. We may now pro­ceed to review the campaigns of 737, 736, 735, 731, and 730.

CHAPTER V

MEDIA AND URARTU

In 743, Tiglath Pileser had come into direct conflict with Sardurri at Kistan in Qummuh, and although victorious, had been so far crippled by the battle, as to prevent him from following up the Urartian king. During his march into Qummuh he had lost Arpad, and since that was the objective point of that year’s campaign, he returned to besiege it in 742. But although Arpad remained for the time being in the hands of Mati'ilu, its rightful king, and despite the fact that Sardurri had made his escape, Tiglath Pileser was not so far exhausted by the battle of Kistan, but that he could cross the Euphrates and raid the cities of Ququsansa, Harbisina, and Ezzida. However, he neither desired at the time nor was he able to press on nearer to the Urartian capital, and invade Ulluba and Kilhi. Arpad had first to be taken and Northern Syria to be conquered.

But Ulluba and Kilhi were the objective points in 739. They had to be in Assyrian hands before Sardurri could be searched out in his home land, and doubtless the work of this year was only another step towards the investment of Van, which was undertaken in 735. The particulars of the campaign are meagre, for the Annal record is missing, and the remaining inscriptions give few details. The Canon furnishes only the bare announcement, to Ulluba. In 831, Shalmaneser II had been compelled to send an expedition into Ulluba and Kilhi, for the Urartians had already at that time annexed those two countries, and they had been under the control of Urartu ever since. Now in 739 Tiglath Pileser inaugurates that series of campaigns which was designed to culminate in a final reckoning with Sardurri, whom he had from the beginning recognized as Assyria's most dangerous foe. If he can conquer Ulluba and Kilhi and so administer them as to keep them loyal, he will not only have destroyed the buffer state which protected Urartu on the west, but will open a way for his troops to Sardurri’s very door. The brevity of the sources does not give the impression that great importance was attached to the accomplishments of the year. We are told that a city, Assur-iki-sa, was established, where the cult of Assur was instituted, and where a governor was installed to administer the two conquered provinces. In Plimmir he erected an image of his royalty.

The following year finds Tiglath Pileser again in the West, and in 737 he was engaged in Media. But in 736 his operations are prosecuted in nearly the same territory which engaged his attention in 739. At the foot of the Nal Range were fortresses and natural conformations which would be of great defensive value to Urartu should Tiglath Pileser attempt to invade it. Furthermore, the Assyrian had to possess them in order to feel secure against a raid by Sardurri into Ulluba. At Kistan Sardurri had suffered a stinging defeat, and since then his best provinces had been taken from him. Although ho had not ventured into open conflict all the while he was being despoiled, and was seemingly content to remain quietly at home, he could not be trusted to remain a passive spectator altogether. There was no telling what sudden enterprise he might institute or at what point he might unexpectedly emerge. Kilhi adjoined Urartu on the southwest, and it was from that direction that he could most quickly appear. He had to gain only one victory and Tiglath Pileser would have suffered a setback perhaps sufficient to hamper his plans for years. The Urartian was at all times a dangerous enemy against whom precaution was as imperative as active campaigning. All the more therefore did Tiglath Pileser need to secure the Nal region. To hold it, once Ulluba, and Kilhi were in his hands, made the conquest of these lands complete and the possession of Nairi final.

Tiglath Pileser took the most important cities of the district. Ten thousand prisoners were captured, and over 20,000 head of cattle, together with a large number of mules and horses, made up the profits of the campaign. Why Tiglath Pileser did not penetrate Ulluba and Kilhi in 739 we do not know; perhaps because of lack of time; or it may be that only a part of his army was engaged at the time while he was busy preparing for other campaigns. Perhaps, too, Sardurri, pursuing his favorite policy, fostered sedition against Assyria in Media, while Tiglath Pileser was busily engaged in the North and the East. At any rate, one of the years intervening between the campaigns of 739 and 736 was spent in the East, and the following one, as the Canon has it, was devoted to 'mat'. A part of the country subdued in this campaign had been dealt with in 744. That it had to be reconquered does not speak well for the thoroughness of the first expedition, but does not warrant our thinking that the work, was laxly done at that time. In the first place, Tiglath Pileser had to contend with the machinations of Sardurri, and no conquest could be considered final until the latter was thoroughly routed. As in the West and the North, so here in the East, uprisings were undoubtedly fathered by him. People who would never have dreamed of throwing off the yoke so soon after having experienced the power of Assyrian arms, were incited to rebellion by Urartian persuasion. Then, too, the campaign of 744 was only Tiglath Pileser's second one. He had not yet conquered a sufficiently large number of peoples to transplant into these Median and Elamitish districts, thus to impair the homogeneity of the original population. There were still enough of the native inhabitants left to allow of concerted action. It must also be remembered that in 744 Tiglath Pileseris possessions were not yet extensive, and he had not sufficient land in which to scatter conquered tribes. Hence the work of 744 had to be repeated. The sphere of operations as located by Billerbeck was in the valley of the Derund, about Sinna, the territory between the Pendsch-Ali and Talvantu-dagh, and also in the vicinity of Sakkis. Whether, as in the first campaign in this region, the army moved in one or more corps, is not to be decided, for we have no hint as to the original base of operations, and the various districts mentioned cannot be located with such exactness as to determine the line of march. The country covered was very extensive, and perhaps some of the lands mentioned, especially those already conquered in 744, were brought back into control by the invasion of few regiments, since garrison posts had been established in 744. It is not to be supposed that the uprising in each district spread over its entire extent.

At any rate, the country from Bikni in the far north-east, to Niqu in the southwest, was overrun. Perhaps Niqu was taken on the return march after crossing over the Pushti-Kuh Mountains. Tiglath Pileser had on his way south thought it necessary to take Til-Assur; and this he reached, if Ann. 158 gives the actual route followed, after passing through Bit-Zualzas and Bit-Matti. Til-Ashur and Bit-Istar reveal by their names that they were originally Assyrian, or were near enough to Assyria to have been incorporated into the Empire, or to have at least retained their Assyrian character. Of course, these names may have been given them after their conquest.

Some of the conquered tribes, like the Bit-Sangibutti were of Babylonian origin; others were located on the southwestern border of Media. At various places in the district conquered, Tiglath Pileser erected images of his royalty. The spoils of victory included all those productions in which the territory abounded, and as usual Tiglath Pileser did not stint his share. Horses, canals, cattle, mules, “without number I carried away”. Sixty-five thousand persons were deported to other dependencies.

From the borders of Urartu on the north and Rhagian Media on the northeast, to the eastern frontiers of Babylonia and the boundaries of Assyria proper, Tiglath Pileser was now undisputed master. No enemy was left to contest his supremacy except Sardurri. With him ho was now ready to deal. There was in fact no other alternative. Any attempt to penetrate further west than he had gone in 742-740 and in 733, was not likely to be completely prosperous as long as Sardurri was loft unmolested in the rear. In the immediate neighborhood of Urartu and in the stretch of country between Lake Vam and Lake Urumia on one side, and between Van and Assyria on the south, no vassals were left to Sardurri except perhaps in Parsua and Bustus, and these were not powerful. The time for Tiglath Pileser to strike at the centre of Urartian power had come. He was not the man to delay. In 735 the road led to Turuspa. Sardurri h ad ventured forth only once, and he had good reason to remember the consequent defeat at Kistan. If he would not come forth to battle a second time, Tiglath Pileser must go to him. Bui it was no easy task; in fact, no Assyrian king ever undertook a more arduous one. To reach Turuspa, the capital of Urartu, no approach was feasible, save from the north. On the south the Arjerosh mountains reached almost to the shores of Lake Van. The passes were possible both because of the snow and the ease with which they could be defended against an invading army, nor was the way via the Tigris and the Bitlis-chai and thence west along the shore of the lake easier. The bridle paths along the south shore of the lake were naturally fitted for opposition to a big army. From the south and the cast the difficulties were also forbidding, for the Khoturdagh Range would have proved snowy graves for the Assyrian soldiers. There were but two possible routes. One led from the north shore of Lake Urumia by Tabris and Khoi to Bejazet. Just before reaching Bejazet the road turns off southwest to Lake Van. The second, the one which Tiglath Pileser took, led across the Murad-Tschai, between Musch and Manesgard, then through Dajaini, and northward along the base of the Sipa Dagh, straight to Lake Van and Turuspa. Before reaching Turuspa Tiglath Pileser sent a detachment to Mt. Birdasu, northwest of Lake Van, though just what this move was calculated to gain for him we do not know. The main body of the troops ravaged Urartu throughout its extent. Cities and villages were sacked and the country plundered. Sardurri was cooped up in his hill citadel, where he was safe, but as far as his eye could reach, the track of the Assyrian army was marked by a line of fire and heaps of ashes. Turuspa, however, was impregnable. Tiglath Pileser could not starve out the garrison without a fleet to cut off the food supply that came into the citadel by way of the lake.

At the base of the citadel hill Tiglath Pileser set up the image of his royalty and turned back homeward. Sardurri lived, but Urartu's power was dead. Ruas, son of Sardurri, rebuilt Turuspa on an even more impregnable rock, and we find him in conflict with Sargon some years later, but as far as danger to Assyrian supremacy was concerned, Urartu could henceforth be safely disregarded. Assyria had vindicated her right to the mastery of Western Asia.

To the west or the south, as occasion might demand, Tiglath Pileser could now turn his attention without fear of the foe who had up to 735 obstructed every step. We have seen how in the following years, 734-732, this freedom from Sardurri's influence made the western campaign easy. Now but one foe of account remained. From the Mediterranean to Mt. Bikni and the Caspian on the north, and from Judah to farthest Media on the south, Assyria was supreme. It only remained for Tiglath Pileser to gain the crown of Babylon, and Assyria would be without a rival state in Asia Minor.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONQUEST OF BABYLONIA

For Tiglath Pileser III to gain the crown of Babylonia was to acquire the unique distinction of being the first Assyrian king to rule simultaneously in both countries. There can be no doubt that this had been his aim from the very beginning, and its achievement marks him as the greatest of Assyrian conquerors. Nor had his ambition outrun his power to accomplish a wonderful work. Of all the nations in Western Asia only Babylonia retained a measure of real autonomy, and of that autonomy the Babylonians were exceedingly proud and jealous. Tiglath Pileser, because his vast empire was at peace, might be prepared to 'grasp the hands of Bel'. But it is doubtful whether or not the Babylonians would have been equally anxious to welcome him as their king, had all been well with them. Perhaps internal trouble would not have been sufficient excuse for Tiglath Pileser to march south into Babylon in 729, as he had done in the first year of his reign. At any rate, he waited until a disruption of government in Babylonia led to the interference of the Chaldeans in Babylonian affairs; and fortune played into his hands. In 730 Tiglath Pileser was prepared for any eventuality, for there was no disturbance in any part of his wide realm. Babylon alone was in a ferment. From 745 and up to his death, Nabunasir had remained loyal to Tiglath Pileser. But in all probability there always existed a pro-Babylonian party in Babylon, which had never ceased to agitate against the overlordship of Assyria, and had rendered Nabunasir's reign precarious. The fact that Borsippa revolted is significant, for it was one of the cities captured by Tiglath Pileser in 745.

Nabunasir was succeeded by Nabu-nadin-zir, who, after a very brief reign, was killed by Nabu-sum-ukin, an usurper. He was perhaps successful in his usurpation because the anti-Assyrian party were his Sponsors. Throughout all this turmoil of rapid regnal and dynastic change Tiglath Pileser remained at home, watchful and apparently passive. As long as the strife in Babylonia was purely domestic he had no urgent need to fear for his own plans; but soon the inevitable happened. The Chaldeans, who never allowed an opportunity of gaining a foothold in Babylonia to escape them, took advantage of the disturbed conditions of government. Their most powerful tribe, the Bit-Ammukani, under the leadership of Ukinzir, entered Babylon. Ukinzir proclaimed himself king. Tiglath Pileser's excuse had come. As the suzerain of Babylon, he was her natural protector from foreign foes, and he could not allow the always dangerous Chaldeans to come into such threatening proximity to the Assyrian border line. If no Babylonian could hold the throne, certainly neither must a Chaldean be permitted to do so.

Tiglath Pileser marches south, his objective point being Sapia, the capital of Ukinzir and the metropolis of the Bit-Ammukani. En route he conquered the Puqudu and thoroughly subjugated them. Their cities, Hilimmu and Pillutu, were sacked and the whole district placed under a governor whose seat of administration was at Arrapha. A large number of the inhabitants of the conquered territory were transported into Assyria and settled there in scattered colonies. The Silani people fared even worse. Nabu-usabsi, their king, was killed, and Sarrabani, his royal city, ruined, while the cities of Tarbapu and Iabullu were added to the number of ash heaps left in the wake of the destroyer. The whole territory gave up 55,000 prisoners.

Next came the Bit-Saalli. Their king must in some way have perjured himself. He retreated into his capital, Dur-Illatai, which he fortified, but to no purpose. The city was obliged to surrender, and together with Amlilatu, rendered up its treasure and contributed its large quota to the 50,400 prisoners who were parcelled out into widely distributed settlements. But the city which Tiglath Pileser was most anxious to take, Sapia, successfully resisted every siege device. All its surrounding country was devastated, but Ukinzir retained his capital, at least for the time being. To complete the subjugation of the Chaldeans was impossible while Ukinzir remained unsubdued, but all the rest of the tribes were made tributary. Balasu, too, of the Dakkuri, sent tokens of submission; while Merodach Baladan of the Bit-Yakin, a country no king of which had ever done homage to Assyria, journeyed to Tiglath Pileser's camp while the latter was besieging Sapia, and rendered his voluntary tribute of precious metals and the products of his swamp-land country, To the list of subject princes was added Nadin of Larrak. All that now stood between Tiglath Pileser and the throne of Babylon, was Ukinzir. To achieve his ambition, the Bit-Amukkani and their leader had to be put out of the way. The year 730 Tiglath Pileser spent at home, preparing for the final campaign.

In all likelihood, this interval of preparation was a busy time in diplomacy and intrigue. Even with Ukinzir out of the way, there was still an anti-Assyrian party in Babylon, who could be depended upon to resist to the last the crowning of a foreigner. These pro-Babylonians would accept Tiglath Pileser’s aid in freeing their country of the Chaldean danger, but would insist on having a native sovereign. How did the always powerful priesthood stand in the matter? In 745, while a native king ruled, they had hailed Tiglath Pileser as king of Assyria, and as such had brought him gifts for clearing their country of her enemies. Would they accept him as king of their own land in 729? To ascertain their attitude with surety Tiglath Pileser during his stay at home in 730, probably carried on negotiations with the priests. Perhaps the defeat of Ukinzir was part of the price which the priests exacted in exchange for any aid they might promise to render to the Assyrian king, in his efforts to gain the Babylonian crown. Cyrus in later times probably gained just such an easy access to Babylon because of a previous compact with the priesthood, and it demands no great stretch of the imagination to think that Tiglath Pileser too had a perfectly clear understanding with the priestly caste. At any rate in 729 he proceeded south a second time, and this time his operations against Sapia were successful. Ukinzir was captured and of course executed. The way to the throne of Babylon was now clear. On the New Yearis day Tiglath Pileser III 'grasped the hands of Bel', and was crowned under the name of Pulu. De facto and de jure king of Assyria, king of Sumer and Akkad, conqueror of Western Asia, a prince without rival, the usurper of 745 has become the master of civilization.

Great pity it is that the records are mutilated. Were the sources not so meagre, a fuller knowledge would perhaps compel us to class Tiglath Pileser III as the equal of Cyrus, than whom the Eastern world produced no mightier warrior and administrator. From the Caspian to Egypt, all of Asia was dependent upon Assyria. No future king would hold his empire more firmly than Tiglath Pileser had held it, nor inspire greater respect and fear of his mighty power. In 728 Tiglath Pileser repeated the ceremony of coronation at Babylon, and in 727, in the month of Tebet, he died. His son, Shalmaneser IV, succeeded him, but the dynasty was short-lived, for Shalmaneser ruled but five years, and in 722 the stranger Sargon founded a new line. He, too, was a usurper, his succession to the throne resulting from a reaction to the tendencies which had been responsible for the elevation of Tiglath Pileser. The latter king's reign was only of comparatively brief duration, but t sufficed him to make Assyria strong enough to endure until her cultural work for civilization was finished. In modern eyes that must consti­tute his chief glory.

During his reign he had time to build but one palace, and that, as has been noted, was dismantled by Esarhaddon. But better than a palace, he builded an empire, far-flung, but well governed and fairly compact, despite the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed. The central problem of Assyrian statecraft was to weld the subject races and peoples into a homogeneous unit. Such a task was never fully accomplished, either by Assyria or by any of the great world powers that succeeded her, but Tiglath Pileser approximated to it sufficiently well to erect a structure far more stable than that of any of his predecessors and to render Assyria safe until her work was done.

After he had conquered a territory, he, like his predecessors, placed it under the administrative supervision of the governor of the immediately adjoining province, or else made an entirely new province out of it. Tiglath Pileser's innovation consisted in this: whereas former kings had colonized a newly acquired land with settlers from Assyria proper, and had placed portions of the conquered subjects in scattered colonies throughout Assyria, he kept his Assyrian subjects at home. His empire was too extensive to do otherwise. Had he colonized subject lands with Assyrians he must soon have depleted the native and homogeneous population of the home country. Instead, he effected a transfer of subjugated peoples from one dependency to a far distant one. His aim was to keep Assyria intact and thus to minimize the danger of rebellion and revolt. He allowed no colony of foreign settlers to be large enough or near enough to one of their own affiliation to permit the possibility of any concerted action against the imperial government. The colonies were so located that their thought-habit, their customs, their religion, and even their language made them, if not offensive to their new neighbors, at least a segregated unit among them. No collusion, in fact, no bond of sympathy between the old and the new population was possible. It might even happen that an uprising on the part of the old settlers would operate to attach the new colonists more closely to Assyria. For the first step in a rebellion is generally a demonstration against the stranger within the gates. In the event of such demonstrations the new settler would have no recourse but to appeal to Assyria. He had no greater love for Assyria than had the strangers among whom he had been settled, but to feed fat his grudge and nurse vengeance would in no wise answer his need of self-preservation. Assyria had to be petitioned for help, and granting it, came naturally to be regarded as a deliverer. Thus a measure of real loyalty was secured, and it was probably in this way that Panammu of Samal was rendered faithful. The Assyrian army was never so numerous as to permit large detachments to be stationed at garrison posts. At most, a governor might have a small company to aid him in the enforcement of his authority. The realization that Assyria was ready to back up her officials might not deter a determined people from revolt. If the rebellion arose in a district far from Assyria, and might be long in coming and the uprising have assumed very serious proportions before its arrival; but with Tiglath Pileser's plan in effect there was a colony of strange settlers on the spot. These had no affiliations with the indigenous population and could readily be pressed into service to aid the governor until reinforcements arrived. It is more than probable that this plan of colonization resulted in furnishing a source of recruiting for the army which obviated too great a drain upon the male portion of Assyrian population. With only a fair-sized force from home, a considerable contingent of vassals could be enlisted en route to the seat of disturbance, together with a number of troops from among the foreign colonists in the vicinity.

It was this system of colonization that gave Assyria the lease of life which she enjoyed. It might even have insured her a longer national existence, had she not been far too small to hold out against the barbarians who later on overran Babylonia and put an end to its career. To his high ability as a warrior, and the glory with which he graced his country's name, there must be ascribed to Tiglath Pileser III as his greatest credit, that administrative system which conserved the existence of the Empire until Babylon once again came into her own.